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Institutional Failure, Monetary 
Scarcity, and the Depreciation of the 
Continental 
CHARLES W. CALOMIRIS 
Money without credit is no money. 
Boston Gazette, Feb. 2, 1778 
All these iniquities are founded on the false idea, 
that money is but a sign. 
Count Destutt Tracy 
The efforts of some American colonials, who complained of monetary scarcity 
and advocated increased government involvement in supplying paper money, 
were valid attempts to improve economic welfare and facilitate transactions. The 
potential for improvement depended crucially on the fiscal and monetary policies 
of colonial governments. This approach to monetary scarcity is useful for 
explaining variation in the real supply of money across colonies and over time. 
The role of fiscal and monetary policies in determining the changing value of the 
continental, and the consequences for real currency supply during and after the 
Revolution, are examined in detail. 
W hether the colonies suffered a scarcity of money has been a topic 
of debate among economic historians. Throughout eighteenth- 
century America there were a wide variety of circulating media- 
foreign coins and bills, a trivial number of domestic coins, and private, 
colonial, state and continental notes.' Specie import cost was inflated 
before the Revolutionary War by mercantilistic prohibitions and duties 
intended to encourage the flow of specie from the colonies to Britain. 
These included direct prohibitions on specie exports from Britain, 
duties that biased the terms of trade in favor of the home country, 
prohibitions on competing trade and manufacturing within the colonies, 
and restrictions on colonial trade with foreign powers. Colonial bills 
were restricted in supply by prohibitions and limitations originating in 
The Journal of Economic History, Vol. XLVIII, No. I (Mar. 1988). X The Economic History 
Association. All rights reserved. ISSN 0022-0507. 
The author is Assistant Professor of Economics, Northwestern University, Evanston, IL 60201. 
He wishes to thank Paul David, Paul Evans, John McCusker, Ronald Michener, Joel Mokyr, 
Elizabeth Nuxoll, Bruce D. Smith, Gavin Wright, and three anonymous referees for helpful 
criticisms of earlier drafts, and Claudia Goldin and Carol Petraitis for the care with which they 
edited the manuscript. 
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1 Colonial notes took two forms: obligations backed by colonial land banks and notes of colonial 




Britain, as well as by local government prohibitions of private paper 
issues and local limits on emissions of legal-tender currency. Parliament 
enacted its prohibitions at the behest of British and colonial creditors 
who saw in paper money a means to reduce the value of hard-currency 
debt. Some colonials complained that government regulations and 
government unwillingness to supply sufficient paper bills caused unnec- 
essary monetary scarcity. 
The testimony of contemporaries, who often seem to have regarded 
the medium of exchange as outside the influence of, that is exogenous 
to, commerce, and available data on the real stock of paper currency 
indicate wide fluctuations in long-run paper real balances. Contempo- 
raries often perceived a causal influence for these fluctuations on the 
extent of trade. In 1718, New York's Governor Hunter stated: "I do 
affirm that since the circulation of these bills, the trade of this place has 
increased at least above a half of what it was."2 The currency stock 
valued in real terms at roughly 8 million Spanish milled dollars was 
viewed as a severe shortage in 1775, and the trebling of real balances 
from 1775 to 1776 due to state and continental note issues confirms the 
earlier potential for growth in real money balances. 
In this article I address the question whether the notion of monetary 
scarcity is consistent with contemporary complaints, economic theory, 
and observed fluctuations in real money balances. I focus on the 
issuance and depreciation of continental bills and the dramatic fluctua- 
tions in real money balances which they produced. 
Most economists believe the supply of real money in the long run is 
an endogenous variable, determined independently of the nominal 
money supply, and they have expressed skepticism concerning reports 
of changing real scarcity and abundance. In part this skepticism follows 
from interpreting "scarcity" as a disequilibrium phenomenon. If specie 
imports determine marginal changes in the long-run supply of money 
and if prices eventually adjust to equilibrium levels, the long-run real 
supply of money is independent of short-run disequilibrium changes in 
real balances due to shocks in the nominal supply of money or the level 
of prices. 
A different interpretation of long-run scarcity, however, is consistent 
with both observed long-run swings in real balances and equilibrium 
analysis, and the ideas of some contemporary proponents of colonial 
monetary policy. This interpretation defines equilibrium monetary scar- 
city to be consistent with Milton Friedman's view of optimal money- 
supply policy.3 If government policy can costlessly increase the long- 
run level of consumer surplus enjoyed by moneyholders, then the 
2 Gilbert C. Fite and Jim E. Reese, An Economic History of the United States (2nd edn., New 
York, 1973), p. 95. 
3See Milton Friedman, The Optimum Quantity of Money and Other Essays (Chicago, 1969). 
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failure to implement that optimal policy makes money unnecessarily 
scarce. I argue that complaints of monetary scarcity and calls for 
government actions to increase the supply of paper money were often 
reasonable exhortations for institutional reform, rather than merely 
attempts to extinguish specie debt with depreciated paper, or evidence 
of unsophisticated economic analysis. 
Benjamin Franklin's and Adam Smith's views on paper money are the 
starting point for a model of equilibrium scarcity. This framework is 
applied first to general patterns in the movements of nominal and real 
balances in various colonies, and then to the specific case of the 
depreciation of the continental. The explanation of scarcity focuses on 
the potential for improving social welfare by displacing specie money 
and avoiding transacting costs by supplying paper money. The need for 
appropriate fiscal, as well as monetary, reforms to accomplish this end 
is a central feature of the model. Historically, the failure to implement 
accompanying changes in fiscal policy to provide real "tax backing" to 
nominal currency made the difference between monetary emissions that 
increased the real paper-money supply and those that merely caused 
changes in the price level. 
In the case of the continental, depreciation resulted from the failure of 
the Confederation to provide a credible commitment to back its cur- 
rency debt. The demand for money would have supported a large real 
expansion of properly backed government currency relative to the level 
achieved by actual emissions. The relatively high exchange value of 
Morris notes and warrants, the notes of the Bank of North America, and 
state-issued notes in the 1780s are evidence that the continental's 
demise primarily reflected a crisis of confidence in tax policy. Depreci- 
ation and monetary scarcity were a consequence of the perverse 
allocation of the power to tax before and under the Articles of 
Confederation. The principal institutional flaws that led to depreciation 
were the lack of coordination of finances among the states and the 
failure of the Articles of Confederation to provide the necessary link 
between expenditure-induced nominal currency issues, on the one 
hand, and the credible backing of currency through future taxation, on 
the other hand. 
The importance of tax backing for determining the value of colonial 
money recently has been stressed by Bruce D. Smith and Elmus Wicker 
as applications of the rational expectations models of Robert Barro, 
Thomas Sargent and Neil Wallace.4 The approach presented here draws 
4 See Bruce D. Smith, "Some Colonial Evidence on Two Theories of Money: Maryland and the 
Carolinas," Journal of Political Economy, 93 (Dec. 1985), pp. 1178-1211, "American Colonial 
Monetary Regimes: The Failure of the Quantity Theory of Money and Some Evidence in Favor of 
an Alternate View," Canadian Journal of Economics, 18 (Aug. 1985), pp. 531-65, "Money and 
Inflation in the American Colonies: Further Evidence on the Failure of the Quantity Theory" 
(unpublished manuscript, University of Western Ontario, 1987); Elmus Wicker, "Colonial Mone- 
50 Calomiris 
on this work but differs in two important respects. First, to develop a 
framework that explains the effects of continental note emissions, the 
specific form of tax backing for these notes is described. Second, a real 
demand for money as a medium of exchange is assumed. The inclusion 
of a real demand for money entails a possible consumer surplus from 
money holdings, which implies the potential for monetary scarcity in the 
sense of Friedman.5 
I. EQUILIBRIUM MONETARY SCARCITY: BEN FRANKLIN 
AND ADAM SMITH 
The desire to alleviate monetary scarcity was the principal motivation 
for Benjamin Franklin's advocacy of monetary emissions in Pennsylva- 
nia. Franklin was among the most articulate advocates of expanding the 
government's role in money creation. In 1729, at the age of twenty- 
three, he wrote "A Modest Inquiry into the Nature and Necessity of a 
Paper Currency," a polemic supporting the creation of land banks in 
Pennsylvania. Franklin argued that the expansion of properly backed 
paper currency could have a lasting real effect on the aggregate stock of 
money and the extent of trade.' 
Franklin focused on the favorable developmental consequences for a 
capital-poor, land-rich economy of being able to substitute paper for 
exportable specie. Franklin expounded on the virtues of multiple 
deposit expansion in Europe and the great saving enjoyed through 
fractional reserve banking and consequent reductions in specie hold- 
ings. The mortgage-backed currency issued by land banks, he reasoned, 
would be even more efficient because it would not direct any real 
resources to production of the exchange medium. In addition to the 
tary Standards Contrasted: Evidence from the Seven Years' War," this JOURNAL, 45 (Dec. 1985), 
pp. 869-84; Thomas Sargent and Neil Wallace, "Some Unpleasant Monetarist Arithmetic," 
Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Quarterly Review (Fall 1981), pp. 1-17; Neil Wallace, "A 
Modigliani-Miller Theorem for Open-Market Operations," American Economic Review, 71 (June 
1981), pp. 267-74; Robert J. Barro, "Are Government Bonds Net Wealth?" Journal of Political 
Economy, 82 (Nov. 1974), pp. 1095-1117. 
s Consumer surplus refers to the utility gain from consumption over and above the cost of 
consuming. Consumers pay a price in foregone interest earnings equal to the marginal gain from 
holding a unit of money, but they receive utility from infra-marginal money holdings in excess of 
this cost. 
6 See Jared Sparks, ed., The Works of Benjamin Franklin (Boston, 1840), vol. 2. Franklin argues 
that abundant money leads to lower interest rates, greater production, immigration, and special- 
ization by enhancing the rapid settlement of debts and by insuring that traders will always be able 
to purchase the bundle of goods they desire. Furthermore, in a currency-scarce economy, 
merchants who deal in foreign goods often are forced to pay wages and debts in kind from 
inventories, and thereby promote the consumption of foreign goods to the detriment of local 
commerce. In this context, land-backed paper money has a developmental "bootstrapping" role in 
moving the economy beyond a critical initial threshold which allows exchange and specialization 
to thrive, given that settlers are land-rich, lack tradeable wealth, and face limits on borrowing 
abroad. 
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wealth-creating advantages of paper money, Franklin argued that paper 
provides a preferable medium of exchange because it is lighter and does 
not lose value by wear.7 
Franklin addressed opponents of land banks who claimed that an 
increase in money always led to inflation. He maintained that credible 
land-backed money would not be inflationary, in part because its 
creation corresponded to the earmarking of a set of real assets which 
backed it.8 The importance of backing in determining the value of 
money was extended by analogy to the government's use of its assets 
(future taxes) as a means of redeeming and giving value to its debts, 
including currency. Noteworthy American proponents of this view 
included Franklin, Robert Morris, Gouverneur Morris, Alexander 
Hamilton, James Madison, and John Adams. 
Adam Smith, in The Wealth of Nations, describes the two compo- 
nents of tax-backed money's value which determine its price in the 
market-namely, future taxes and interim liquidity benefits: 
A prince who should enact that a certain proportion of taxes should be paid in a paper 
money of a certain kind, might thereby give a certain value to this paper money, even 
though the time of its final discharge and redemption should depend altogether on the 
will of the prince. If the bank which issues this paper were careful to keep the quantity 
of it always somewhat below what could easily be employed in this manner, the demand 
for it might be such as to make it even bear a premium, or sell for somewhat more in the 
market than the quantity of gold and silver for which it was issued.9 
Adam Smith argued that the demand for money-like debt depended not 
only on the backing of money, but on the sufficiency of the supply of 
competing liquid claims in the economy as a whole. He allowed money 
demand, as well as land or tax backing, to influence the value of 
money-like claims through the liquidity premium money enjoys.10 These 
two determinants of the value of money are incorporated into a formal 
model, presented in the Appendix, which forms the basis for analyzing 
colonial and revolutionary monetary experience. 
7 Hanson points out that the costliness of importing small-denomination coins made small- 
denomination paper currency especially desirable to colonial moneyholders, and that colonial 
governments elected to print a large proportion of relatively small denomination bills. See John R. 
Hanson III, "Money in the Colonial American Economy: An Extension," Economic Inquiry, 17 
(Apr. 1979), pp. 281-86, and "Small Notes in the American Colonies," Explorations in Economic 
History, 17 (Oct. 1980), pp. 411-20. 
8 See Sparks, Franklin, vol. 2, pp. 273-74. 
9Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations, Edwin Canaan, ed. (New York, 1937), p. 311. 
'? Evidence that other contemporaries interpreted events in these terms abounds. While specific 
examples are too many to enumerate, a prominent illustrative one is a letter of Gouverneur Morris 
of March 5, 1782, which summarizes his tax-based interpretation of the depreciation of the 
continental. See John Catanzariti and E. James Ferguson, eds., The Papers of Robert Morris 
(Pittsburgh, 1984), vol. 4, pp. 353-58. I am indebted to Elizabeth Nuxoll, associate editor of The 
Papers of Robert Morris, for bringing this example to my attention. Additional evidence of the 
prevalence of the tax-based view of government money is provided in the appendix to Smith, 
"Further Evidence." 
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The essential features of the formal model are intuitive. A promise to 
redeem paper money for specie (or specie tax obligations) at a future 
date fixes the expected future real value of the paper currency. This is 
true even if the public is uncertain whether or to what extent the 
government will fulfill its promise to redeem the currency. While not all 
colonial currency issues promised specific dates of redemption, this was 
often the case.1' The relevance of this assumption for the continental is 
discussed below. The real future backing of paper currency implies that 
an increase in nominal paper money can lead to an increase in real paper 
money. 
By increasing real paper money the government allows individuals to 
conserve specie holdings and increases social wealth.12 By providing 
current securities to be redeemed by future taxes, the paper emission 
might increase wealth by more than the amount of specie displacement 
if individuals value future tax obligations using a high discount rate."3 
Furthermore, if paper money is a superior transacting medium- 
because it is lighter and of smaller denomination than specie-then its 
availability increases economic welfare by even more than these pecu- 
niary benefits by allowing individuals to economize on transacting 
costs. As long as the level of real balances is below the level of the 
optimal money supply, there is an opportunity for the government to 
alleviate notional scarcity by increasing the supply of paper money. 
Increases in the nominal supply of money which are not backed with 
anticipated future taxes, however, will not increase the real supply of 
paper money or the level of social welfare. 
II. COLONIAL MONETARY REPIMES AND MONETARY SCARCITY 
The tax-based framework describes an obvious connection between 
fiscal policy and the value of paper money, noted most recently by 
11 In "Colonial Monetary Standards," Wicker points out that currency issues during the Seven 
Years' War typically had promised terminal dates of redemption. 
12In "Further Evidence," Bruce D. Smith claims there was a positive correlation between 
specie flows and paper money issues, rather than the negative association which specie displace- 
ment by paper would imply. He argues this is evidence against competition in demand between 
specie and paper monies. Smith's argument relies implicitly on the assumption that changes in the 
supply of bills were uncorrelated with changes in the level of demand for money. If money supply 
were procyclical, however, increases in real paper money would not necessarily be associated with 
outflows of specie. Lester's discussion of the factors influencing the timing of currency issues in 
Pennsylvania, New York, New Jersey, and Delaware argues for an important connection between 
changes in the supply and demand for paper money. He shows that paper currency was issued to 
stimulate the economy; thus currency issues were procyclical. Lester also argues that noninfla- 
tionary currency issues led to specie resource savings, increased prosperity, and an environment 
conducive to financial contracting (for example, p. 133). See Richard Lester, Monetary Experi- 
ments: Early American and Recent Scandinavian (Princeton, 1939). 
13 Either finite time horizons or imperfect capital markets can account for the non-equivalence of 
debt and taxes. See R. Glenn Hubbard and Kenneth L. Judd, "Liquidity Constraints, Fiscal 
Policy, and Consumption," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1 (1986), pp. 1-60. 
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Bruce D. Smith and Elmus Wicker. Smith points out that differences in 
the fiscal policy regimes of the colonies correspond to differences in 
co-movements of nominal emissions and real balances. In some in- 
stances, changes in nominal notes are not associated with changes in 
real balances, while in others the association is strong.14 He shows, for 
example, that the strong fiscal backing of the Middle Colonies main- 
tained the value of their bills despite increases in nominal supply, unlike 
the fiscally profligate governments of Rhode Island and (before 1750) 
Massachusetts, whose bills routinely depreciated with new nominal issues. 
A clear change in the pattern of co-movement between real and 
nominal issues in Massachusetts that coincided with a fiscal policy 
reform provides additional evidence of a connection between tax 
backing and currency valuation. After 1749, fiscal reform made credible 
the specie backing of Massachusetts currency. While the real value of 
Rhode Island currency remained relatively insensitive to changes in 
nominal supply, the real value of Massachusetts currency rose and 
became highly correlated with nominal issues. The post-1750 pattern of 
association between nominal and real balances in Massachusetts mir- 
rors the association apparent in the Middle Colonies. 
These patterns are reflected in Table 1. In regimes of poor tax 
backing, Rhode Island and Massachusetts before 1750, changes in 
nominal money are associated with changes in price rather than real 
balances. In regimes of strong tax backing, New York and Pennsylva- 
nia, for example, increases in nominal money supply are associated with 
a one-for-one rise in real paper balances."5 
In summary, money was unnecessarily scarce in the colonies. In 
some, taxation was the binding constraint on real paper money expan- 
sion, but in others although the tax base would have supported a larger 
supply of real balances, nominal money was kept low. In all cases, the 
real supply of paper money could have been increased by a combination 
of increased taxation and nominal emissions. 
14 Smith and Wicker were not the first to notice these differing patterns. Other useful comparative 
studies of colonial monetary institutions and experience include: Leslie Brock, The Currency of the 
American Colonies, 1700-1764: A Study of Colonial Finance and Imperial Relations (New York, 
1975); Joseph Ernst, Money and Politics in America, 1755-1775 (Chapel Hill, 1973); Lester, 
Monetary Experiments; John McCusker, Money and Exchange in Europe and America, 1600-1775 
(Chapel Hill, 1978); Theodore Thayer, "The Land Bank System in the American Colonies," this 
JOURNAL, 13 (Spring 1953), pp. 145-59; Roger Weiss, "The Issue of Paper Money in the American 
Colonies, 1720-1774," this JOURNAL, 30 (Dec. 1970), pp. 770-84; and Robert Craig West, "Money 
in the Colonial American Economy," Economic Inquiry, 16 (Jan. 1978), pp. 1-15. 
15 Colonies with reliable tax backing which maintained a relatively stable value of their 
currencies may have further reduced transacting costs by encouraging the use of credit. In her 
detailed study of colonial wealth in 1774 Alice Hanson Jones finds that in the Middle Colonies- 
New York, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and Delaware-financial assets of each wealth and 
occupational class are much greater a percentage of total assets or net worth than they are in New 
England or the South. See Alice Hanson Jones, Wealth of a Nation to Be: The American Colonies 
on the Eve of the Revolution (New York, 1980). 
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TABLE I 
NOMINAL AND DEFLATED NOTES PER THOUSAND PERSONS 
Massachusetts Rhode Island Pennsylvania New York 
Nominal Deflated Nominal Deflated Nominal Deflated Nominal Deflated 
1720 2,087 953 3,400 1,333 1,200 737 
1725 2,540 755 945 678 
1730 2,938 870 5,800 1,476 1,330 875 
1735 2,556 711 11,900 2,845 1,000 602 
1740 2,159 412 18,300 3,003 935 565 1,255 755 
1745 4,824 748 22,000 2,934 780 446 
1750 12,257 8,925 14,900 1,241 707 414 2,000 1,115 
1755 250 188 19,500 1,034 702 416 1,850 1,027 
1760 2,229 1,727 31,500 1,221 2,660 2,533 3,500 2,096 
1765 1,536 1,153 14,200 481 1,440 1,274 
New Jersey Maryland South Carolina 
Nominal Deflated Nominal Deflated Nominal Deflated 
1720 
1725 
1730 3,550 551 
1735 545 388 
1740 1,207 751 676 296 
1745 646 323 
1750 460 265 439 247 2,142b 295b 
1755 41a 24a 409 252 2,801 400 
1760 592 405 9,182 1,312 
1765 4,327 610 
a Figures are for 1754. 
b Figures are for 1749. 
Note: Sterling exchange rates are used as deflators. 
Sources: Derived from Bruce D. Smith, "Some Evidence on Two Theories of Money: Maryland 
and the Carolinas," Journal of Political Economy, 93 (Dec. 1985), pp. 1128-121 1; and Bruce D. 
Smith, "American Colonial Monetary Regimes: The Failure of the Quantity Theory of Money and 
Some Evidence in Favor of an Alternate View," Canadian Journal of Economics, 18 (Aug. 1985), 
pp. 531-65. 
III. CURRENCY SUPPLY, TAX CONSTRAINTS, AND 
REVOLUTIONARY FINANCE 
Pelatiah Webster's estimate of total specie and bills in America at the 
beginning of 1775 is $10 million (specie equivalent).'6 From May 1775 to 
November 1776 the states, acting individually, defied British prohibi- 
16 Webster rejected Hamilton's estimate of $30 million outstanding, "on a more critical 
examination of the subject." Ronald Michener supports this estimate as being, "more consistent 
with the probate evidence and our knowledge of the amount of colonial currency in circulation at 
that time." See Pelatiah Webster, Political Essays on the Nature and Operation of Money, Public 
Finances, . . and Other Subjects (Philadelphia, 1791), p. 142; and Ronald Michener, "Fixed 
Exchange Rates and the Quantity Theory in Colonial America," Carnegie-Rochester Conference 
Series on Public Policy, 27 (Autumn 1987), p. 279. Hamilton's estimate is given in his letter to 
Robert Morris dated April 30, 1781. See Catanzariti and Ferguson, eds., The Papers of Robert 
Morris, vol. 1, p. 35. 
Depreciation of the Continental 55 
tions on currency issues and provided for their rebellious needs by 
emitting a large quantity of bills. The nominal emissions of the states for 
1775 and 1776 totaled approximately $18 million.17 
The greatest source of increase in liquidity during the early war years, 
however, was the bills first authorized by the Continental Congress in 
May 1775. By the end of 1776, Congress had issued $25 million in 
continentals for which it received $21 million in specie value.18 
The first continentals were issued to pay for outfitting the army. When 
Congress issued its first paper bills, it had no intention of fighting a 
protracted war with Great Britain or of financing large expenditures by 
money creation. Forming an army was a threat, a bargaining chip to use 
in obtaining concessions from Great Britain, a demonstration of the 
colonies' unity and resolve. Similar threats had proven successful in the 
past in securing the repeal of the Stamp Act and the Townshend Act. 
Initially, other means of financing the emergency expenditures were 
not feasible. There was little time to set up institutions for adequate 
taxation. Moreover, Congress lacked the power to tax and was disin- 
clined to do so-taxation without adequate representation was a sensi- 
tive issue in 1775. And there was insufficient time to place domestic and 
foreign loans initially.'9 
The value of the continental rested on the reliability of future real 
taxation per unit of nominal issue. The bills all promised redemption 
according to the stipulation of Congress, which had promised to redeem 
them on specific dates, beginning in 1779. Though Congress had no 
power to tax, the delegates to the convention pledged joint and several 
liability on behalf of the individual colonies, and specific colony quotas 
were established on the basis of population. Congress suggested that 
each colony create a sinking fund to demonstrate good faith. The 
prevailing belief that these issues would be limited nominally, along 
with the belief that unused government procurements and future taxes 
would sink them, allowed the bills to trade at par with specie until 
mid- 1776. 
The profound increase in real balances which state and congressional 
emissions entailed indicates that the two-and-one-half million colonial 
17 Nominal emissions are taken from Edward F. Robinson, "Continental Treasury Administra- 
tion, 1775-1781: A Study in the Financial History of the American Revolution" (Ph.D. dissertation, 
University of Wisconsin, 1969), pp. 327-28. Data are adapted from figures reported in Ralph V. 
Harlow, "Aspects of Revolutionary Finance, 1775-1783," American Historical Review, 35 (Oct., 
1929), pp. 46-68. I am indebted to Ronald Michener for bringing these data to my attention. 
18 Table 2 summarizes data and sources for nominal currency issues and their real value. 
9 For more detailed accounts of the financing of the Revolution than that offered here see Albert 
Bolles, Financial History of the United States, 1774-1789 (New York, 1883); Charles Bullock, 
"The Finances of the United States from 1775 to 1789," Bulletin of the University of Wisconsin: 
Economic, Political Science, and History Series, 1 (June 1895); Davis Dewey, Financial History of 
the United States (New York, 1903); E. James Ferguson, The Power of the Purse: A History of 
American Public Finance, 1776-1790 (Chapel Hill, 1961); and William Graham Sumner, The 
Financier and the Finances of the American Revolution (New York, 1892). 
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FIGURE I 
TOTAL SILVER VALUE OF CONGRESSIONAL BILLS OF CREDIT 
Sources: See Table 2. 
inhabitants were willing to hold much more than the meager real supply 
of paper currency in circulation before the war. Though it is customary 
for money demand to rise during wartime-presumably because of a 
desire to increase the proportion of mobile, concealable wealth-the 
rise in real balances seems too large to attribute to a change in money 
demand. Later, during the time of greatest national crisis, when one 
would expect money demand to have risen to its height, real paper- 
money balances fell dramatically, as Figure I demonstrates.2 
The bills began to depreciate relative to specie in mid-1776. Table 2 
summarizes data on currency issue and the rate of depreciation from 
1775 to 1781, after which the bills ceased to circulate. The depreciation 
of the currency and the decline in real money balances coincided with 
decaying confidence in the ultimate redemption of the bills. A variety of 
factors contributed to the changing valuation of money from November 
1776 to May 1781 battle successes and failures, the French alliance, 
government indexation policies (discussed further below)-all precipi- 
tated appreciation or depreciation through their impact on anticipations 
of future redemption. 
Congress repeatedly expressed a desire to maintain the currency at 
par to establish a favorable reputation for future financing and to 
minimize the cost per dollar issued of current financing. The early 
20 From 1777 to 1780 state bills were relatively small, and states maintained parity between 
federal and state bills. Thus the inclusion of state bills in Figure 1 would increase real values for 
1775/76 significantly, but contribute proportionately less to real supply for 1777/79. 
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TABLE 2 
NOTE ISSUES, EXCHANGE RATE, AND SPECIE VALUES 
Specie Value of 
Amount Issued Exchange Rate New Issues 
Date of Issue (000) Paper/Specie (000) 
1775 $6,000 At par $6,000 
1776 
February 4,000 At par 4,000 
May 5,000 1.25 4,000 
July and August 5,000 1.25 4,000 
November and December 5,000 1.50 3,330 
1777 
February 5,000 3.10 1,600 
May 5,000 3.00 1,660 
August 1,000 3.00 330 
November 1,000 4.00 250 
December 1,000 5.00 200 
1778 
January 3,000 5.00 600 
February 2,000 6.00 330 
March 2,000 5.00 400 
April 6,500 5.00 1,300 
May 5,000 5.00 1,000 
June 5,000 5.00 1,000 
July 5,000 5.00 1,000 
September 15,000 6.00 2,500 
November 10,000 8.00 1,250 
December 10,000 10.00 1,000 
1779 
February 10,000 17.00 580 
April 5,000 20.00 250 
May 10,000 20.00 500 
January and Maya 40,000 20.00 2,000 
June 10,000 24.00 410 
July 15,000 24.00 620 
September 15,000 38.00 390 
October 5,000 41.00 120 
November 20,050 50.00 400 
(continued) 
slippage in the value of bills caused congressional concern. In late 1776 
and early 1777 Congress responded to the continuing depreciation of its 
bills by asking the states: 
(1) To accept congressional bills as payment for state taxes at par with state bills, and 
to force private parties to exchange congressional bills at prevailing specie prices. The 
states complied with this request in piecemeal fashion, though the regulations of private 
commerce were mostly ineffectual. The main effect of these laws was to link the value 
of state bills to the depreciating continentals. 
(2) To cease issuing new state bills, and instead to meet local fiscal needs with 
taxation. On the whole the states acceded to this request until the acceleration of state 
bill issues in 1780. 
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TABLE 2-continued 
NOTE ISSUES, EXCHANGE RATE, AND SPECIE VALUES 
Specie Value of 
Amount Issued Exchange Rate New Issues 
Date of Issue (000) Paper/Specie (000) 
1780 
January 0 40.00 0 
February 0 45.25 0 
March 0 61.50 0 
April 0 61.21 0 
May 0 59.67 0 
June 0 56.30 0 
July 0 61.38 0 
August 0 70.00 0 
September 0 72.33 0 
October 0 70.00 0 
November 0 86.87 0 
December 0 99.54 0 
1781 
January 0 103.33 0 
February 0 102.50 0 
March 0 125.00 0 
April 0 146.67 0 
Total $241,500 
a Bullock conjectures that only $40 million in new issues were made under this authorization. 
Sources: All data for 1775 through 1779 are taken from Charles Bullock, "The Finances of the 
United States from 1775 to 1789," Bulletin of the University of Wisconsin: Economic, Political 
Science, and History Series, 1 (June 1895), p. 135. Specie exchange rates for 1780 and 1781 are 
from Anne Bezanson, Prices and Inflation during the American Revolution (Philadelphia, 1951), p. 
65. 
(3) To begin sinking tax quotas in order to inspire confidence in the sagging currency. 
This request was not met to any significant degree.21 
For the next three years Congress struggled simultaneously to finance 
war needs and support its currency. It continued appeals to the states 
for quota sinking funds and reiterated its promise of full redemption. It 
experimented with alternative means of finance including lotteries, 
piracy, domestic loans, and foreign loans; but these sources were 
insufficient to support the war effort. Most of the funds borrowed from 
abroad were needed to maintain hard-currency interest payments on 
loans. Roughly 40 percent of the total cost of the war-some $38 million 
(specie equivalent)-was financed by continental issues. Receipts from 
domestic national loans financed roughly 10 percent of the cost of the 
war, while state debt issues and seizures of property accounted for 
respective shares of 18 and 17 percent. Foreign loans raised less than 8 
percent of the total, and taxes accounted for only 6 percent.22 
21 See Bolles, Financial History, pp. 147-49. 
22These statistics are derived from Bullock, "Finances," pp. 177ff. 
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Three important events coincided with an acceleration of deprecia- 
tion from late 1778 through 1779: 1) 170 percent nominal money growth 
during 1778; 2) in mid-1779, the indexation of domestic loans and public 
servants' wages (made retroactive to 1778 for loans) to the rate of bill 
creation, which extended the indexation rule established for soldiers' 
pay in December 1776; and 3) defeats in the South. These events led 
people to revise forecasts of future expenditure upward and the prob- 
ability of redemption of bills downward. 
In late 1779 Congress launched a campaign to convince people that it 
would redeem its obligations in full, but words were insufficient to stop 
speculation against the bills. By the end of 1779 Congress had ceased 
issuing bills; rather it relied on specific supply requisitions from the 
states and the seizure of property by troops on an ad hoc basis in 
exchange for certificates of indebtedness. Still the bills continued to 
depreciate. 
In March 1780 Congress made a last ditch effort to halt depreciation 
by reducing the promised specie backing of bills to one-fortieth of par, 
which was roughly the market value of the bills at the beginning of 1780. 
Congress also proposed that the states declare a special tax for which 
bills would be receivable relative to specie at forty for one. At the same 
time, Congress proposed to issue one-twentieth of the outstanding stock 
of old bills in paper of a new tenor-indicating an intention effectively to 
double the existing nominal bill supply. The states (except Massachu- 
setts) refused to accept the old currency in payment for taxes at the rate 
of forty for one; instead they indexed the bill/specie exchange rate for 
tax payment to the prevailing market rate. Thus the states accepted bills 
on the same terms as private parties, rather than providing the notes 
with any backing. Without the tax backing of the states, the continental 
continued to depreciate, even though its nominal supply remained 
unchanged. In fact, it depreciated exactly in proportion to the an- 
nounced effective increase in nominal currency, despite congressional 
assurances. As Gouverneur Morris writes: 
The moment when former promises are demonstrated to be fallacious, is not the 
moment to make new promises. The strict connections between the new paper and the 
old injured it, because the depreciation of the old from forty to eighty, necessaryly [sic] 
brought down the new to two for one.23 
By mid-1781 continentals had ceased to circulate and were held from 
that time on solely as a speculative store of value. Specie imports and 
new state bill issues became the media of exchange. Congressional 
power and credit were at an all-time low. Individual states were 
financing and organizing their activities in an uncoordinated fashion. 
Specific supply requisitions and seizures of property led to inefficient 
allocations, high transport costs, public resentment, and the misuse of 
23 Catanzariti and Ferguson, eds., The Papers of Robert Morris, vol. 4, p. 354. 
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authority by government officials. A dramatic improvement came when 
Robert Morris resuscitated the credit of the government by pledging his 
own assets as backing for government obligations (called Morris notes 
and warrants). He contracted with private merchants to supply troops 
on the basis of competitive bidding. Morris also took out loans on the 
government's behalf from the newly organized, privately held, Bank of 
North America. 
Morris's personal backing was not a long-term solution to the 
government's credibility problem; it was the temporary substitution of 
credible private credit for defunct public credit. All attempts to provide 
the government with its own source of revenue (and hence cred vere 
met with opposition by the states. Attempts to pass modest import 
duties were defeated by Rhode Island's opposition in 1781, and by New 
York's veto in 1783. Though Morris had solved the crisis of financing 
the war, his administration was unable to achieve a long-term solution 
to the problem of federal credibility. Indeed, the fate of the continental 
would not be decided until after the Constitution had granted the federal 
government a means to secure its own revenue. 
Applying the Tax-Based Model to the Continental 
The central assumptions of Adam Smith's analysis of paper money's 
value are applicable to the Revolutionary currency. Bills were initially 
issued with an explicit commitment to remove them four years in the 
future, and new emissions announced in 1780 had a six-year promised 
maturity. They were to be collected by the states in payment of taxes, 
then sent to Congress for cancellation and crediting to the states' 
accounts. No authority backed the currency contemporaneously. State 
tax collectors traded in the currency and accepted it at the market rate, 
but the states-and Congress itself-did not make a market in the 
currency or accept it for taxes at a pre-set rate of exchange. Rather they 
adopted indexation schedules for wages, taxes, and loan principals. The 
only backing was potential redemption. 
The value of the promise to redeem continentals depended crucially 
on the ability and willingness of Congress to tax. Under the Articles of 
Confederation, however, only states had taxation authority, while both 
Congress and states could issue money and other debt. The redemption 
of continentals required the completion of the following chain of events: 
the war had to be won, Congress had to want to redeem its currency, the 
states had to be willing to transfer resources to Congress or to vest it 
with the power to tax, and the public had to be sufficiently wealthy and 
willing to be taxed.24 Any threat to a link in this chain of events reduced 
the probability of redemption. 
24 The aggregate wealth to support the taxation needed to back the bills clearly existed. See the 
discussion in Bolles, Financial History, p. 85. 
Depreciation of the Continental 61 
The depreciation of the currency was not uniform, nor did it corre- 
spond closely to changes in nominal supply during much of the period. 
While increases in nominal supply (and expected nominal supply in 
early 1780) often did have an inflationary effect on the value of currency, 
nominal issues initially led to a boom in the real supply of money rather 
than an offsetting increase in the price level. Moreover, much depreci- 
ation occurred in 1781, even after Congress had ceased issuing paper 
money once and for all. 
These facts indicate that the time path of real balances was dominated 
by changing redemption expectations. Early issues of continentals were 
accepted at par because expected backing relative to currency issued 
was sufficient. As expected tax collections fell and the nominal money 
supply rose, nominal money came to exceed the level of expected 
backing. At this point money growth and changes in expectations of 
future tax collections together determined the value of money; changes 
in nominal money were reflected proportionately in price level changes, 
while changes in expected tax collections affected prices and real 
balances. 
The realization that the British would wage war, their early suc- 
cesses, and their impending invasion of Philadelphia hurt the currency 
and reduced real balances (see Figure 1), just as the British withdrawal 
from Philadelphia, the French alliance, and the small nominal emissions 
of 1777 helped to stabilize its value in early 1778. Though Congress 
seems to have wanted to redeem its bills through 1778, the indexation of 
loan principals and wages by Congress to the rate of bill creation in 1779 
did not bode well for congressional commitment to the currency; neither 
did the Forty-for-One Act of 1780. 
Throughout, the failure of the states to support the currency or to vest 
Congress with the power to tax was a primary cause of depreciation. 
Clearly, the states were capable of better supporting the common 
currency, but they chose not to. An indication of this is the relative 
values of state and continental notes. Like many of the other states, 
Pennsylvania ceased issuing its own bills from 1777 until 1780, and 
maintained parity in tax collection between state and continental 
currency during the period. After the Forty-for-One Act this changed; 
not only did Pennsylvania cease to maintain parity between the two 
types of bills, it increased its own issues greatly, despite the pleas of 
Congress for restraint. Table 3 shows that while the continental depre- 
ciated to a level of several hundred to one (bills-to-specie), state bills 
during the 1780s traded at near par with specie for much of the period. 
To contemporaries it was clear that the difference between the state 
and continental bills was the expected value of each for extinguishing 
taxes. One merchant wrote: "the state money has got into very general 
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TABLE 3 
RATIOS OF PENNSYLVANIA STATE CURRENCY TO SPECIE, 1780-1789 
Jan. Feb. Mar. April May June July Aug. Sept. Oct. Nov. Dec. 
1780 3.00 
1781 1.33 1.73 1.99 4.09 4.38 5.00 2.25 2.50 
1782 3.00 3.00 4.00 
1783 3.00 1.25 1.25 1.25 1.33 
1784 
1785 2.50 3.00 1.75 1.12 
1786 1.11 1.05 1.08 1.11 1.12 1.12 
1787 1.10 1.75 1.16 1.22 1.30 1.38 1.58 
1788 1.43 1.56 
1789 1.33 1.43 1.33 1.28 1. 
Source: Anne Bezanson, Prices and Inflation during the American Revolution (Philadelphia, 1951), 
p. 345. 
circulation, especially since it became receivable in taxes."25 Anne 
Bezanson points out that the interval from 1777 to 1780, during which 
real currency supply was lowest, corresponds to a hiatus in merchant 
activity in Philadelphia, which on the basis of merchant accounts she 
attributes in part to the increased scarcity of a transacting medium.26 
The Political Economy of Revolutionary Finance 
Much still remains to be explained: why Congress issued so much 
currency rather than other debt, why the states did not choose to 
support the continental, why Congress chose to index the principal of its 
other debt in favor of supporting its currency, and why Congress, once 
given taxation power under the Constitution, chose to repudiate its 
commitment to currencyholders but not to other debtholders.27 Conti- 
nentals were eventually redeemed for one-hundredth of their face value; 
at the same time, Congress redeemed its other debt and debts incurred 
by the states in full. 
Congress was constrained to issue cash rather than to finance with 
other debt or taxes because it lacked power and could not compel the 
states to sink existing congressional debt. That a lack of access to future 
tax receipts can imply quantity constraints to sovereign borrowers in 
bond markets was as common a theme in the eighteenth century as it is 
today.28 
25 Anne Bezanson, Prices and Inflation during the American Revolution (Philadelphia, 1951), p. 48. 
26 Ibid. It is important to keep in mind that specie substitution for paper was precluded by the 
state of war. Only in 1780 did specie inflows begin to play a role. 
27 Winning lottery tickets were repudiated as well. 
28 For example, the fiscal crisis which led Louis XVI to convene the estates general was 
precipitated by credit rationing in foreign markets which had its root cause in the large existing debt 
relative to available future tax flows. If the present value of the existing tax stream is less than 
outstanding debt, either monetization of the debt or an increase in net taxes must result. 
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The fiscal reluctance of the states was the result of both strategic 
behavior and the practical difficulty of establishing a fair distribution of 
the tax burden among the states. The Articles of Confederation called 
for quotas on the basis of wealth, not population. No one, however, had 
estimated the wealth of the colonies, so population was used for the 
recommended congressional tax quotas. Those in poorer states felt this 
an unfair burden and found support in the Articles of Confederation. 
From a strategic perspective, it made little sense for any state to sink 
its quota before the others, even if that state was willing to act 
cooperatively. The states had assumed joint and several liability for 
congressional debt, which meant that the payment of taxes by any one 
state did not relieve that state of potential obligations, if other states 
refused to pay. One might expect the result to be few tax payments, 
even if all states would have benefited from jointly supporting the 
currency. William Sumner describes the combined effect of the debate 
over fair quotas and the strategic play among the states: 
It was impossible to know how much each state ought to pay, and there was no adequate 
publication of the facts as to what each state had paid. Being in the dark as to facts, each 
state maintained that it had paid more than its share.29 
In allocating the funds at its disposal, the national authorities, 
empowered by the Articles of Confederation and the Constitution, 
chose to give preferential treatment to individuals who held debt in 
forms other than continentals. The policy of indexing debt principal to 
the rate of bill creation, begun in 1779, foreshadowed the different 
redemption policies followed by Congress under Hamilton's plan. The 
policy may be viewed as a preference for using the "inflation tax" in lieu 
of direct taxation. In fact, policymakers described their actions in 
precisely these terms. Morris writes that " . . .the depreciation of the 
paper money, which wiped away not less than twelve millions annually, 
was in effect a tax to that amount.30 
Some viewed the inflation tax as the most equitable means of 
spreading the burden of taxation. As Franklin wrote: 
The general effect of the depreciation among the inhabitants of the States has been this, 
that it has operated as a gradual tax upon them, and every man has paid his share of the 
tax according to the time he retained any of the money in his hands, and to the 
depreciation within that time. Thus it has proved a tax on money, a kind of property 
very difficult to be taxed in any other mode; and it has fallen more equally than many 
other taxes, as those people paid most, who, being richest, had most money passing 
through their hands.3' 
29 Sumner, Financier, vol. 1, p. 273. 
30 Ibid., vol. 2, p. 76. 
3' Sparks, Franklin, vol. 2, p. 424. 
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Equity may only be part of the motivation for taxing money balances. 
It may benefit the government to default on money before it does so on 
bonds. For example, if international bond markets are more competitive 
than domestic currency markets, governments may choose to favor 
bondholders over currencyholders. A pattern of preferential treatment 
to bondholders can be seen in many episodes of government financial 
stringency, for example, the priority given to specie redemption of 
bonds over the resumption of specie payments for greenbacks after the 
American Civil War.32 Indeed, part of the reason opponents of govern- 
ment paper money failed to prohibit it explicitly in the Constitution was 
the desire to employ it during periods of unpredictable high expenditure 
(for example during wartime).33 The use of currency as a war-financing 
expedient helps to insulate the government's reputation in bond markets 
by removing the need to default on some portion of government debt. 
The Legacy of Hyperinflation 
The financial legacy of the American Revolution was distrust of 
government money which, when combined with the struggle over 
private bank chartering privileges, contributed to the prolonged inade- 
quacy of financial institutions in the United States.34 Critics of govern- 
ment monetary control cited the revolutionary experience as proof that 
governments could not be trusted to repay their monetary obligations. 
Such bitter opposition to government bill issues led to the prohibition of 
state bill issues by the Constitution. Federal powers regarding paper 
money creation were left deliberately vague by the framers as a 
compromise between those who advocated absolute prohibition and 
those who saw the advantage of occasional issues. 
While a small amount of government currency was issued during the 
War of 1812, only the financial exigencies produced by the Civil War led 
the government once again to create a substantial supply of paper 
money. The somewhat credible commitment to resume specie backing 
of greenbacks limited their depreciation, and the achievement of re- 
sumption in 1879 set the stage for a permanent government role in 
supplying paper money.35 Thus the displacement of the post-Revolution 
32 For a review of government policy during and after the Civil War, see Paul Studenski and 
Herman Krooss, Financial History of the United States (New York, 1963); and Charles Calomiris, 
"Price and Exchange Rate Determination during the Greenback Suspension" (unpublished 
manuscript, Northwestern University, 1987). 
33 See J. Willard Hurst, A Legal History of Money in the United States (Lincoln, Nebraska, 
1973), p. 16, for a discussion of the constitutional debate over federal monetary powers. 
34 Ironically, overvalued foreign coins, which were made receivable for payment of U.S. taxes, 
provided a token, resource-saving alternative to full-specie-value coins. These coins were an 
intermediate step in terms of savings between specie and paper currency. A thorough discussion of 
the use of token foreign coins can be found in David Martin, "The Changing Role of Foreign 
Money in the United States, 1782-1857," this JOURNAL, 37 (Dec. 1977), pp. 1009-27. 
3_ See Calomiris, "Greenback Suspension," for an analysis of resumption expectations and their 
effect on the value of greenbacks. 
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view of government-created paper money as a financing instrument of 
last resort coincided with a change in the government's revealed 
commitment o currencyholders, and this was linked to changes in the 
power and inclination to back government debt of all kinds with taxes. 
Appendix 
It is useful to construct a formal model of money valuation to analyze the determi- 
nants of equilibrium monetary scarcity. Money is defined as a government liability; its 
value depends on its future backing by real assets through its usefulness as a means of 
extinguishing real tax obligations which otherwise would be paid in specie, and the 
interim flow of liquidity services it provides.36 From this approach follow three 
important implications: 1) total expected real taxation potentially constrains the supply 
of real money and thus may cause monetary scarcity; 2) the means for relieving 
monetary scarcity may be either a real increase in taxes (and transfers) or an increase 
in nominal bill issues, depending on which constraint binds real balances at the margin; 
and 3) sometimes changes in real balances through time indicate changing perceptions 
of future fiscal policy (that is, if tax constraints are binding on real balances). These 
points form the basis for interpreting cross-sectional variation among colonies in the 
correlation between nominal and real balances and for the discussion of changes in the 
real money supply during the American Revolution. 
The first version of the model excludes specie balances for simplicity. This assump- 
tion later is relaxed. I adopt a standard, representative-agent, flexible-price model of the 
economy with markets for (nondurable) goods, paper money, and interest-bearing debt. 
The real rate of interest (r) is given in equilibrium by exogenous intertemporal time 
preference, and (the logarithm of) real income (y) is determined by exogenous aggregate 
labor supply. (The logarithm of) real money (m - p) demand is assumed to depend 
negatively on the nominal rate of interest (r + n) and positively on (the logarithm of) real 
income: 
(m -p)t = kIy - j (r + nt), 
where k and j are positive constants, t indexes time, and n is the (known) rate of 
inflation. The negative coefficient on the nominal interest rate reflects the interest cost 
from holding wealth in noninterest-bearing money. 
Initially, at time zero (t = 0), the government issues (through a lump-sum transfer) a 
fixed nominal supply of noninterest-bearing bills, which fixes m at a constant level until 
the last period (t = x). The government (credibly) sets (the logarithm of) lump-sum taxes 
collected in the last period equal to T units in terms of specie. It promises to accept its 
bills in payment of taxes in lieu of specie at the prevailing market exchange rate in the 
last period, or at par (one unit of paper instead of one unit of specie), whichever implies 
a lower value for the bills.37 This assumption captures the upper bound of promised 
specie parity which placed an upper bound on the value of paper bills. 
36The motivation for government intervention in the creation of paper money must rest on a 
comparative advantage which the government enjoys in supplying liquidity relative to private 
citizens. Typically, the government's claim on the future through taxation is viewed as the source 
of that advantage. If one defines liquid assets as those whose backing is a matter of common 
information, then dependable taxation would provide superior backing for liquid assets than most 
other forms of backing. 
37 For continental notes the upper bound on their value was set by the promise to redeem the 
currency at par for Spanish milled dollars. Clearly, this represented the maximum future value for 
the currency. 
66 Calomiris 
The role of taxation in the model is to provide an endpoint condition with which to 
determine the time path of the price level. The money demand function alone does not 
provide enough information to solve for price over time, because price depends on its 
own rate of change (n). Typically, solutions to this problem rely on expectations of 
future government policy-or in colloquial terms, the "backing" of currency. 
In this framework, government taxation policy fixes the marginal value of money in 
the last period to be equal to its value in extinguishing tax obligations. This implies two 
possible results. If m is less than T, nominal bills will trade at par at t = x (px = 0) and 
some specie, as well as all bills in circulation, will be paid in to the government as taxes. 
If m is greater than T, the price level (the inverse of the specie value of bills) will be 
greater than unity at t = x (px = m - T) and no specie will be paid in as taxes. Thus given 
a knowledge of T and m, one can determine pxe 
If there were no demand function for paper money-that is, if bills were only valued 
as a store of wealth-then the time path of the price level would be consistent with a 
constant rate of growth in the value of bills (deflation) equal to r from t = 0 to t = x. 
Prices of specie (and other commodities) would fall at the rate r to pay the market rate 
of interest to moneyholders, who in the absence of a demand for liquidity view money 
purely as a store of value. Given the assumption of a real demand for bills as a 
transacting medium during the holding period between t = 0 and t = x, however, the 
equilibrium time path of price depends crucially on the parameters of money demand. 
To derive the time path of price, solve recursively for p using Px and the money demand 
function: 
m - ky +ir =px- -i(px - px-i), 
or 
(m - b) = (1 + J)Px-I - JPx, 
where b = ky - jr, the zero-inflation level of money demand. 
First, consider the case where Px = (m - 7), and therefore, (m - 7) is greater than 
zero. Substituting for Px above gives: 
(m - b) +j(m - T) = (1 +J)Px-i, 
and 
(m - T) - (m - b) = (1 + j) (px - Px-i), 
which reduces to 
(b - T) = (I + j)nx-1. 
Intuitively, this equation implies that if the real value of money balances at the end 
period (that is, 7) is greater than the zero-inflation equilibrium level of real balances (b), 
there must be deflation in equilibrium to make marginal money holdings worthwhile. 
Similarly, if available real balances at time t = x are less than the zero-inflation 
equilibrium level, inflation at t = x - 1 is required to charge money-holders the 
equilibrium "price" for holding money. That is, the scarcity of real balances at t = x 
determines the equilibrium rate of inflation (deflation) at t = x - 1. 
In the second case, where m is less than T and px = 0, the money-demand function 
implies: 
(m - b) = (1 +J)Px-i, 
and whether there is inflation in equilibrium (px-l < 0) again depends on whether the 
level of real balances at the end period (now given by m) is less than the zero-inflation 
equilibrium level of money demand. 
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Which of the two government policy variables, m or T, acts as the binding constraint 
on real balances depends on their relative magnitudes. If m is greater than T, then raising 
m has no effect on real balances at the end period, and therefore, no effect on real 
balances for earlier periods. An increase in T, however, will increase real balances by 
reducing p. Alternatively, if m is less than T, an increase in T will have no effect on real 
balances, since the value of bills has already reached the upper bound of par. However, 
in this case an increase in m will increase real balances.38 
Only one or the other constraint (m or T) can bind in equilibrium, but both m and T 
may be set at suboptimal levels. The optimal m and T-in the sense of Friedman-would 
maximize the present value of the stream of liquidity services moneyholders receive 
between t = 0 and t = x. This would imply a deflationary equilibrium. In a deflationary 
equilibrium, the rate of deflation declines over time because m is constant and p falls 
over time. Setting (b - T) equal to -r(I + j) maximizes the rate of deflation at t = x - 
1 by setting it equal to r, and thus maximizes the flow of liquidity services between t = 
0 and t = X.39 
The availability of coins or other substitutes for government-supplied paper does not 
fundamentally alter the results of the model. In the case of perfect substitution between 
paper and specie money, for example, the price of paper in terms of specie is given, as 
before, by taxation at the end period. The real supply of paper money displaces specie 
one for one, and allows it to be exported for other goods and services. This is the 
resource savings emphasized by Franklin. 
A novel feature of this case is that total real money balances (paper and specie) are 
bounded from below by the zero-inflation level of money demand. Government liquidity 
rent (or seignorage) is limited due to the availability of an elastically supplied (perfect) 
substitute (specie currency) which maintains its real value in specie terms. The 
welfare-maximizing deflationary equilibrium-in which specie is fully displaced, and in 
which money earns the highest possible pecuniary return-is the same as in the case of 
no substitutability between paper and specie. 
In the case of perfect substitutability between paper and coin, increases in paper 
supply cause a one-for-one displacement of specie on the margin. A more complicated 
and realistic model of the demand for paper money would include: a wealth effect in the 
money-demand function, limited substitutability between paper and coin monies due to 
38 In "Fixed Exchange Rates and the Quantity Theory in Colonial America," Michener argues 
that fixed exchange rates rather than tax backing explain colonial price movements in many cases. 
Michener does not provide a convincing explanation for how fixed parities were maintained, and 
the evidence he presents against the tax-backing approach seems inadequate. He focuses on 
evidence of government deficits, tax collection fraud, and failures to retire currency issues by the 
alleged strong-backing colonies as evidence that their backing was in fact poor. The tax-backing 
model presented here requires only that individuals expect to be able to redeem currency for future 
taxes. Continuing reissues of currency or temporary deficits do not in themselves imply poor 
backing or depreciation, so long as parities in tax collection remain in force and the present value 
of future taxes is viewed as adequate. Moreover, one can extend this model to the case where 
potential rather than actual taxes back money. If credible taxation parity is maintained beyond the 
redempton date of bills, individuals may decide not to pay in paper currency for taxes in order to 
retain paper as a medium of exchange. In this case it may be that the present value of money 
balances exceeds the present value of future tax receipts (but not the present value of potential 
taxes which the government would be willing and able to levy if currency-holders came to doubt 
its commitment). In other words, the government could issue currency with minimal actual tax 
backing so long as it could levy taxes when needed to support the currency. 
39 Note that the optimality of increasing the real supply of paper money by increasing taxes 
depends critically on the assumptions of non-distortionary (lump-sum) taxation and government 
transfers. These assumptions allow one to abstract from the potentially negative effects of 
distortions created by tax incentives and the loss of economic resources due to wasteful 
government expenditures. 
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differences in denomination, weight, and resilience to wear, and an endogenous level of 
monetary transactions depending (positively) on the availability of low-cost paper 
money. Each of these elements would reduce the displacement of specie as a 
consequence of increases in paper money supply since the equilibrium demands for both 
monies would rise with an increase in paper supply. 
